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Digital Architextures: Literature, Interpretation, and Computation
Text delivered at  the inaugural lecture of Professor Martin Paul Eve at Birkbeck, University of
London, 12th September 2018.
We have  known for  quite  some years  that  the  medium through  which  the  text  of  literature  is
delivered is both central to its reception but also of academic interest. The study of the history of the
book and of material texts has an excellent pedigree, although I’m going to try to avoid citing
overly trite formulations from Marshall McLuhan.
It is also the case now that for at least the past thirty years, almost every commercially published
work of literature has been a digital object before it has been a print volume. The materiality of the
book, in the past half-century, has moved from manuscripts, to carbon copies and typewriter-ribbon
typescripts, to magnetic storage arrays, backlit CRT screens, solid state drives, through to network
transmission. Certainly, the codex, as perhaps the best technology ever developed for humans to
seek both sequential and random access, persists. But the field of the future history of the book, as
Matt Kirschenbaum has called it, will also have to envelope XML markup, XSL transformations,
Adobe InDesign workflows, digital delivery platforms, network infrastructures, word processing
software, engineering patterns, machine learning, and natural language generation within its field.
Future historians of the book must be multimedia and technological historians if they are truly to
understand the mediations through which literature passes in the twenty-first century.
The seeds  of  such work are  already being sown.  To take the  last  of  my list,  natural  language
generation, it is already the case that sports columns are being written by machine. Indeed, feeding
statistical  sports  data  to  recurrent  character-based neural  networks  is  a  common practice  when
creating summarised standard journalistic writing in this area. Indeed, the desired formulaic and
simplistic nature of this writing is perfect for this kind of process. But lest we think ourselves too
superior, I should point out that we academics are also not exempt from the rise of the machines.
[SLIDE] Take for instance one of my recent weekend hobbyist games in which I used my home
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computing rig to train a recurrent character-based neural network on the literary studies journal
Textual Practice. A character-based neural network essential samples input data to build a model of
the source texts on which it operates. The model, of course, is reductive and aims to statistically
replicate – with a certain degree of loss – the underlying data, while never fully representing them.
After just twenty-four hours of training, though, my network was able to produce some alarmingly
good parodies of academic writing. For instance, the network told me that “The series of temporal
inventions  of  the  object  is  intelligible  only  afterwards”,  which  certainly  sounds  a  probable
proposition. Yet the network also produced statements that seem worryingly self-aware. For ‘The
problem’, as the network aptly phrased it, ‘is that the poem is a construction of the self as a strategy
of self-consciousness and context’. So what might it mean that there is no self-consciousness or
context behind the generation of such a statement? What  does it  mean when a neural network
writes, as though writing of itself, that it quote ‘provides the fraud of the epistemological practices
of knowledge’? The network writes also that it “shall ﬁnd our intellectual values, by rewriting their
very ties’. It seems clear, also, that this particular network inherited an academic sense of humour in
its generation of footnotes, telling me of a fictional work, previously unknown to me, entitled  ‘The
privatized climax’., by John Spottisley, from 1929, p. 4, emphasis in original’.
As humorous as such an exercise may be – and I do find it funny – there is a serious point from
which I want here to kick off. Namely, that the ways in which we read media, content, and form of
literature  are  now conditioned  by  digital  technologies.  For  if,  as  Donna Haraway  once  put  it,
‘Writing is  pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs’,  the balance of activity between our inert
selves and our lively technologies appears ever more to be weighted in favour of the latter. Indeed, I
believe that it makes little sense to speak now of contemporary fiction as somehow opposed, in a
rarefied way, to computational environments – as novelists such as Jonathan Franzen are wont to
do. It is with this in mind that I titled this lecture Digital Architextures, playing on Gérard Genette’s
notion of the architext – that is, with a focus on the placement of text within categories as the object
of the study of poetics. While, as Genette puts it, “Jokes on the word text form a genre that seems to
me indeed overworked”, I do want to posit that another useful category for this type of taxonomic
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exercise might be digital  infrastructures,  and the relationship of literatures to their  enmeshment
within digital architextures. For the digital is the underlying architecture on which all contemporary
fiction, in one way or another, is now hung. 
In some ways, I feel that contemporary literary studies has already misrecognised the consequences
of this shift. The recedence of textual scholarship – that is, the study of the conditions and sociology
of publication for contemporary fiction – seems to me evidence that somehow we believe that
digital methods of book production have eradicated human error from the process. This, seems to
me, clearly not to be the case.
For  just  one  example,  in  1992,  Jennifer  Egan  (a  Pulitzer  prizewinning  author)  won  the  UK
Cosmopolitan short story award with the piece “Sacred Heart”. [SLIDE] As a result – the prize –
Picador  published  her  first  collection,  Emerald  City:  The  Collected  Works  of  Jennifer  Egan
(hereafter  referred  to  as  Emerald  A).  At  that  point,  however,  Egan  had  written  neither  “Why
China?” nor “Sisters of the Moon”, the two stories that she considers the strongest in the eventual
collection from 1996 that would receive the same title, “Emerald City” (hereafter, Emerald B).
It is, therefore, of interest that the “prior UK edition” of Emerald City is, in Egan’s own words
“missing material and full of mistakes and hopefully consigned to oblivion by now”. It also, though,
contains short-story material that has never appeared elsewhere and of which critics are currently
unaware. The original version of the collection is nearly impossible to buy at the time of writing,
but it is available for consultation in national deposit libraries in the UK, such as the British Library.
If future work is to cite this material, I argue, scholars need to be aware of the potential version
variants  and  alternative  implications  of  the  different  texts  by  this  prominent  and  important
American author. Yet, very few people in the space of contemporary fiction studies are conducting
such bibliographic work, or using digital techniques to map such differences.
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At this  point,  it  is  probably necessary to  say a  few words on the “digital  humanities” and the
controversies that enmesh this particular field of study. For, I have been a computer programmer far
longer  than  I  have  been a  literary-studies  academic.  [SLIDE]  And certainly,  reading works  of
literature  with  the  aid  of  statistical  techniques  is  controversial  and  pointing  out  literature’s
inescapable enmeshment within technological fields is, to some, heretical. In the minds of some
commentators, it’s not just that quantification is the opposite of literary art, it’s not merely that,
apparently, counting the word “whale” in  Moby-Dick can only ever tell us one thing: how many
times the word whale is used in Moby-Dick, as Timothy Brennan put it. It is, instead, that, for many
people,  the  digital  humanities  are  increasingly  seen  as  “neoliberal”;  a  critique  voiced  most
forcefully by Daniel Allington, Sarah Brouillette, and David Golumbia. I want to pull apart this
argument a little more.
In order to assert that the digital humanities are neoliberal, one must first define both the digital
humanities and neoliberalism. Despite the mind-boggling quantity of nonsense written on the topic,
it turns out to be neoliberalism that is the  easier  of the two on which to be precise. Put bluntly,
neoliberalism is  a  mode  of  political  economy that  emerged  most  prominently  from the  1980s
onwards in which politics is replaced by economics as the dominant societal logic, to use William
Davies’s pithy formulation. Under such a logic, economics is the most powerful of the academic
disciplines and must form the basis for all State decisions, with the state itself contracted merely to
ensure that the conditions for market exchange can be legally enforced, even while the state itself
must work on a market logic – the state under the supervision of the market, as Michel Foucault had
it.
Within such a definition, one can begin to see how the digital humanities as a field might look a bit,
well, neoliberal. If, for some, neoliberalism is the disenchantment of politics by economics, then,
for others, digital methods for studying literature become the disenchantment of art by mathematics
and computers, an old debate by now in literary theory that goes back at least to the early twentieth-
century Frankfurt  School thinkers. Yet, to be blunt,  the histories don’t  quite match up. Literary
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studies has used quantitative – and even computational – methods for quite some time. For instance,
as Erik Ketzan, one of my Ph.D. students, pointed out to me, Thomas Schaub claimed in 1981 that
“the word ‘bloom’ is one of the most oft-repeated words in” Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot
49 (although he’s actually wrong about this). Dartmouth College offered a course entitled “Literary
Analysis by Computer” as far back as 1969. Further, as Nicholas Dames has noted, Vernon Lee
proposed  a  “statistical  experiment”  –  a  quantitative  analysis  –  on  literature  in  her  1923  The
Handling of Words, itself prompted by a letter to The Times from Emil Reich, several years earlier.
The term “code” has been used extensively in the history of concrete poetry and various types of
machine formalism have emerged in that space,  as another of my students, Bronac Ferran,  has
charted. Quantitative and even computational approaches to the study of fiction are really not that
new.
Yet  it  is  the  development  of  digital,  computational  technologies,  rather  than  just  applied
mathematics, and their application to the study of artforms that really gets the neoliberal accusations
flowing.  The libertarian  political  cultures  of  Silicon Valley,  for  instance,  feed  into  a  perceived
economic amorality of technology to which literature can be posited by scholars as a correcting
humanist and even democratic force, notwithstanding the troubling moralistic value framework that
sits below such an assertion. 
At the same time, though, there are many contradictions and hypocrisies in the critiques of digital
humanities as neoliberal as they stand today. The most pervasive of these, drawn to my attention by
Ted Underwood, is that while many defend the humanities disciplines for their uselessness in the
current age of economic utility (that is, the fact that the study of English literature is “merely” an
end in itself),  it  is demanded that the digital  humanities be useful.  That is,  the most prominent
critique of DH is that it “doesn’t tell us anything useful” about literature (remember the slight on
counting words, above), even while the broader study of literature is defended on the grounds that it
doesn’t have to tell us anything useful.
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The second hypocrisy is the lack of cultural critique around digital self-mediation. By this, I mean
that while digital  editions and digital  approaches to the study of literature are criticized on the
grounds of coercing their material into formats that are amenable to the digital, the fact that those
very same people who voice such critiques will work, daily, on a word processor, writing books that
will  go  to  print,  but  that  began  digitally,  seems  tricky.  They  do  not  seem  to  feel  that  this
compromises their own work, or somehow makes it neoliberal. The neoliberal critique, it seems, is
only  applicable  to  those  who  might  build  tools  that  others  can  use.  So  much  for  the  famous
pronouncement that “the point is to change it”, if you build digital things in the humanities, you will
be tarred with the neoliberal brush.
[SLIDE] Finally, and most importantly, though – and this is where I will bring my thinking on open
access into the picture – I think that digital technologies contain within them a seriously radical
potential in their creation of non-rivalrous objects. As Peter Suber has extensively outlined, until the
advent of the digital, all forms of writing were bound within rivalrous objects. That is, if I took your
book object (a codex), you would no longer have access to the text within it. This is why the UK
definition of “theft” includes the intent to deprive the owner of the original and why it is a poor
metaphor for the digital age, for copying does not deprive the owner of the original artefact of
anything.  The advent of Xerox photocopying changed this relationship of text to object, although it
still remained cheaper to buy the original book than a machine that could copy and/or transmit it. In
the digital realm, the cost-per-copy is radically reduced, to nearly zero. The ability to copy “objects”
– if one can call digital things, objects – at an infinitesimal cost causes profound changes in textual
possibility. The first is that all costs of production are front-loaded; it is the cost to first copy that
matters,  and the labour there invested.  Once that labour has been covered,  the ongoing cost  is
extremely low. The second is the potential,  within certain realms of not-for-profit  education,  to
distribute research (and teaching) material to anyone who wishes to read it, with no charge.
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There are many nuances and caveats to this, into which I don’t have time fully to delve
today, but I want to focus on two aspects here: rivalry and knowledge; and why research is different.
On the first of these, consider that, in Peter Suber’s words:
“Knowledge is non-rivalrous. Your knowledge of a fact or idea does not block mine,
and mine does not block yours. Thomas Jefferson described this situation beautifully in
an 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson: ‘If nature has made any one thing less susceptible
than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea….Its  peculiar character…is that  no one possesses the less,  because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without  lessening  mine;  as  he  who  lights  his  taper  at  mine,  receives  light  without
darkening mine.’”
The point that Suber, I think mostly accurately, deduces from this is that the digital realm is actually
uniquely brilliant for conveying ideas; a non-rivalrous form. For the first time in human history, the
underlying dissemination vessel can match the form of the ideas being transmitted.
The second point to which I will  turn,  though, is  the way in which research production
differs under our current economic conditions from other forms of cultural production.  [SLIDE]
Research in the university remains one of the last remaining systems of payment through patronage.
Researchers are relatively free in their selection of research area (although one could argue that
there  are  many  soft-power  mechanisms  that  steer  such  choice),  and  then  are  free  to  keep  the
copyright on the resultant output, to publish where they see fit. There seems to me no other area in
society, apart from arts funding, that really operates on such a basis.
Yet,  criticisms  of  open access,  and  of  the  digital  space  in  general,  continue.  There  are
Marxist critiques – from people like David Golumbia – and Marxist defences and arguments – from
figures  such  as  Joss  Winn.  There  are  arguments  that  open  access  is  neoliberal  and  there  are
arguments that open access might allow us to regain the commons, as work by my student Stuart
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Lawson has gestured towards.  [SLIDE] There are arguments that open access has only increased
the profits of the mega-publishers and arguments that open access contains within it the seeds of a
new world of social justice and equitable access to knowledge. This is the battlefield within which
my scholarly communications work is fought. As Cameron Neylon put it, to work on open access is
often to find oneself “described as 'neo liberal' (alongside uber capitalist) and 'Marxist'” all within
just a few breaths of one another. My personal belief is that the radical gift of knowledge that we
can bestow to society using digital technologies contains within it a socialist principle at its core and
I work towards open access, in the humanities disciplines, for that reason.
But let us return from open access to the study of literature using computational methods
and  the  study  of  how computational  methods  are  integral  to  the  architecture  of  contemporary
literature. I have written various tools – pieces of software – in this space that undoubtedly fall
under Allington, Golumbia,  and Brouillette’s definitions of “neoliberal tools”. That is,  these are
tools that can be used by others that quantify various aspects of literature, which I see it as part of
my research work to produce. Because this chimes with software production paradigms elsewhere
in Silicon Valley, the critics feel threatened. They believe that “This view”, that there might be a
definition of the humanities that includes computation, in Allington, Golumbia, and Brouillette’s
critique, “reaches its apotheosis in the repeated suggestion that building computational tools should
qualify as a replacement for scholarly writing”.
I would not say that I’ve gone down this road; I have plenty of scholarly writing to back me
up. But there is a longer precedent for tools in the humanities that the critiquing triad are careful to
dodge: literary theory. Foucault himself called his work a “toolkit” (although I’m also aware of the
recent debates on Foucault’s association with neoliberalism). The worst “applications” of literary
theory have simply taken a concept and applied it as a blanket “tool” for quite some years. But I
want now to dive a little into what I have been doing and how the idea that the digital humanities
develops “tools” that can just be uncritically applied rings false.
I am particularly interested in ways in which repetitious, brute-force digital practices can
confirm or refute existing commonplace statements in literary studies. For instance, Andrew Piper’s
recent work on machine-learning classification of fiction and non-fiction is a case in point. Since
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the poststructuralist era of the 1970s, it has been a commonplace of literary philosophy to state that
there is no fundamental distinction between the literary form and the the non-literary. That is, there
is nothing that a work of fiction can do to persuade you of its fictionality or factuality and vice versa
in the case of non-fiction.  Searle and Derrida both convincingly claimed this. For Searle, “The
utterance  acts  of  fiction  are  indistinguishable  from the  utterance  acts  of  serious  discourse”  (in
Logical Status), while for Derrida, “No exposition, no discursive form is intrinsically or essentially
literary before or outside of the function it is assigned” (in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony). The
only problem is that Piper has shown that machine classification can distinguish between fact and
fiction with over 95% accuracy using just a 1,250-word stretch of text. To be clear: this machine is
not determining whether a text is true or not – it doesn’t verify a relationship to the outside world. It
verifies the work’s linguistic relationship to intention. It can distinguish when authors are writing
fiction from when they are writing fact, but not whether the facts are actually true. The number of
exclamation marks, word-percentages pertaining to families, and other features such as personal
pronouns all play a role in detecting this linguistic relation to the expression of intention. Certainly,
one  could  dispute  whether  this  refutes  the  earlier  assertions,  but  it  says  something  extremely
interesting about the relationship of large-scale empiricism against the apparently logical reasoning
of literary-linguistic philosophy. Perhaps, literature is less singular, as my Ph.D. examiner, Derek
Attridge might put it, than we might like to think.
Yet it is our proximity to texts that interests me and while the predominant argument about
so-called “distant reading” is that it might allow us to ingest a large number of texts – more texts
than one could read in a lifetime – I am interested in what digital approaches bring us in the space
of close reading. One of the earliest  pieces of digital  work that I  conducted was an attempt to
quantitatively  understand  interconnectedness  in  one  of  the  most  interconnected  novels  of  the
postmodern age: Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. [SLIDE] Using modifications that I made
to a tool written by David McClure, I created a force-directed graph of the top n terms in a text after
computing a probability density function (using kernel density estimation) filtered by Bray-Curtis
dissimilarity. This results in a map of clustered and connected terms within a specific distance;
which terms occur “together” within a specified distance and are, therefore, most closely connected
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within a work.  My first  attempt at  a  form of computational formalism through spatial  network
mapping.
There are several features of this network map that I found worthy of comment: We can note
that character names are all peripheral while abstract terms, things and actions are usually more
strongly  linked.  This  seems  to  tie  in  with  most  assessments  of  Pynchon’s  character  models.
However, this is a common linguistic model for novels that is to be expected, except in the case of
central characters in narratives; absent in  Gravity’s Rainbow, which has no single set of central
characters but instead spreads the action over about 400 characters.
My critical assertions in my first book that a nostalgic? looking “back” as key to Pynchon’s
works (in my study focused on Lot 49) seem here to have some validity but one that is less centrally
remarked upon in GR; the term “back” is one of the central and most connected nodes in the novel.
There’s an interesting metahistorical clump around the 7pm mark; history, power, political,
system,  structure  and  possibilities  are  all  clustered.  This  might  indicate  that  the  metahistorical
elements of/observations made by the text are not well integrated with the narrative as a whole.
The most isolated narrative is Byron the Bulb, seen at 9pm on the far left. This makes sense
as the text breaks off to relate this parable in complete disconnection from anything else in the
novel. Lastly, the term “Rocket” is nowhere near so central to the novel as one would suppose,
linguistically.
Gravity’s Rainbow has been assessed by many readers as a text that works to generate a
feeling that everything may be connected (as a form of conspiratorial plot) and that, therefore, it
might  equally  be  the  case  that  nothing  is  connected.  Pynchon  terms  these  paranoia  (total
connectedness) and anti-paranoia (utter disconnect).
An  initial  plot  of  the  text  in  this  way  allows  us  to  start  to  consider  whether  the  text
constructs particular linguistic and semantic fields around particular parts of the text. Specific terms
clearly occur in isolated contexts. The octopus rarely returns; most of Roger’s narrative is centred
around his pairing and unpairing with Jessica; Byron the Bulb is far out in his own diegetic layer
with distinct terms that rarely recur.
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Other terms, though, seem scattered across the Zone of the text. As an initial hypothesis that
I need to explore much more: it could be that many of the isolated action segments of the text, to
which critics have turned their  thematic  and historical  attentions,  may share common linguistic
cores  with  many  other  parts  of  the  text.  This  might  begin  to  contribute  to  their  ultimate
connectedness within the novel.
Following on from this early experiment,  [SLIDE]  I  also did some work on authorship
attribution in the novels of Thomas Pynchon. For, in mid-2015, Art Winslow caused something of
an online furore when he suggested that  the pseudonymously-authored novel by “Adrian Jones
Pearson”,  Cow Country,  was, in fact,  a work by Thomas Pynchon. A full-blown argument then
erupted when this was countered by Nate Jones and Pynchon’s own publisher.  Indeed, Penguin
thundered: “[w]e are Thomas Pynchon’s publisher and this is not a book by Thomas Pynchon”.
To be frank, Winslow’s evidence was slight and bound to irritate fans and critics alike. He
argued that the author biography of Cow Country pointed to a recluse; someone who didn’t like to
be in the limelight, a J.D. Salinger. From this, he leapt to the conclusion that Thomas Pynchon was
a likely candidate. The second piece of evidence that Winslow furnished was that the novel is a
work  of  metafiction;  another  potential  Pynchonian  connection.  Winslow  also  evaluates  the
dismantling of binaries within Cow Country, the humorous character names that abound throughout
(we have “Dr Felch”), apparent running Pynchon-like gags and more. For Winslow, “[t]he off-kilter
sensibility one sees in the work of both [authors] would not be […] easily ‘replicable’ by another”.
Cow Country itself  is  an amusing-enough read.  It’s  a  campus novel  set  in  a  backwater
Community College and that documents the trials of the newly arrived educational administrator,
Charlie. This hapless individual is set to head the College’s re-accreditation drive, which, to be
frank  seems  a  big  ask.  For  instance,  the  College’s  new staff  orientation  event  consists  of  the
castration of a calf as an exercise in team building. You get the idea.
In order  to  work a  little  on this  problem, I  turned to a  set  of computational  authorship
attribution methods to examine the stylistic properties of Pynchon’s novels in comparison to Cow
Country. These methods consist of statistical analyses of the most frequent words used by Pynchon
as opposed to Pearson and the order in which they occur. This may sound extremely dry and of little
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worth – counting words  does  not  always go down well  in  literary circles  –  but,  in  fact,  these
techniques have been shown to be highly accurate under specific circumstances. Indeed, at the time
of  writing,  according  to  Ariel  Stolerman,  computational  forensic  stylometry  “can  identify
individuals in sets of 50 authors with better than 90% accuracy, and [can] even [be] scaled to more
than 100,000 authors”.
So, when using such a method (in this case Burrows’s Delta),  do Thomas Pynchon and
Adrian Jones Pearson write in similar ways? I am afraid to say that the answer is a fairly conclusive
“no”, as you might have already concluded yourself. I first explored this using the aforementioned
method using single words, sets of two-words (bigrams), and sets of three words (trigrams) inside
the R programming language’s “Stylo” package. I then clustered these using 30 to 100 words (and
all numbers of words in between: e.g. 31 words, 32 words etc.) and taking the most common result
in 80% and 90% of cases.
Admittedly,  when  using  only  single  words,  there  is  a  similarity  between  Pynchon  and
Pearson that seems alarming. Note that I have also added Don DeLillo’s corpus here in order to
provide a foil for the system and so that we can gauge the accuracy of its profiling techniques. At an
80% consensus between all word frequencies, this algorithm believes that Cow Country is most
similar,  linguistically,  to  Bleeding Edge,  Gravity’s  Rainbow and V.  At 90% there  is  very  little
consensus and the algorithm does not correctly cluster any of the Pynchon works as significantly
close to one another.
[SLIDE]
Things do, though, get a bit more interesting when we move on to bigrams and trigrams. In
the bigram and trigram models – that’s sets of two words in a row that authors share with each other
along with the ways in  which these tropes are ordered – most  of Pynchon’s  novels are tightly
clustered together, indicating a distinct writing style. The same goes for DeLillo. However, Cow
Country does not cluster with these other authors. This points towards the likely probability of a
different author being responsible for this novel.
[SLIDE]
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Indeed, others have speculated, based on hints dropped by Steven Moore, that the actual
author of Cow Country is one A.J. Perry. Perry is the author of two other books, but lists himself as
the author of three on his website. I took one of these books and dropped it into my authorship
profiling tool.
Whether using single words, bigrams, or trigrams, I received exactly the same result in this
case.  Perry’s Twelve Stories of Russia,  A Novel I Guess published in the year 2012, markedly
clusters  with  Cow Country.  Note  also that,  once Perry is  thrown in,  Pynchon and DeLillo  are
clustered almost entirely accurately and distinctly by this algorithm.
From these hobbyist beginnings, I then began work on my latest book, forthcoming with
Stanford University Press next year, which is titled Close Reading with Computers. One of the areas
that  I  explore  therein  is  the  features  of  historically  imagined  style  in  the  contemporary  novel.
[SLIDE] Specifically, I have been working on David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas, a novel that spans six
different generic styles, ranging from a seafaring journal of the 1850s through to a far-future SF
dystopia modelled on Soylent Green. When you want to write fiction that sounds as though it was
written in the 1850s, though, how do you actually do it? Is mimetic accuracy of the language the
crucial point? Mitchell himself thinks not, stating in an interview that “Historical fiction isn’t easy;
it’s not just another genre. How are they going to speak? If you get that too right, it sounds like a
pastiche comedy—people are saying ‘thou’ and ‘prithee’ and ‘gadzooks,’ which they did say, but to
an early 21st-century audience, it’s laughable, even though it’s accurate. So you have to design a
kind of ‘bygone-ese’—it’'s modern enough for readers not to stumble over it, but it’s not so modern
that the reader kind of thinks this could be out of House or Friends or something made for TV”.
Given this statement and the linguistic features of the text, I was interested to discover how far
mimetic accuracy goes in the Pacific Journal of Adam Ewing in Cloud Atlas. The first thing to note
is that the novel gives its own internal dating for the Ewing narrative. We are told, by Frobisher, that
“[m]ention is made of the gold rush, so I suppose we are in 1849 or 1850”. If we take the diary at
face value, then Frobisher is almost right. In fact, the year must be precisely 1850, since this is the
only year in the 1850s range that has the 7th November (the first dated entry in the diary) falling on
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a Thursday. Hence, also, by the internal chronology, when Ewing notes that “[t]oday is [his] thirty-
fourth birthday” on Sunday the 12th January 1851, Ewing’s precise birthday is the 12th January 1817.
In its tight internal chronology that does match the historical record, the text even manages here to
parody the (or, my) act of literary interpretation; Frobisher is akin to the paranoid critic who would
seek out such information.
However, the first thing to note is that we cannot take the date of the diary at face value. As
Frobisher again notes, in a perhaps defensive authorial move for Mitchell, there is “[s]omething
shifty about the journal’s authenticity—seems too structured for a genuine diary, and its language
doesn’t ring quite true”. Frobisher clearly suspects the entire thing to be a literary forgery; which, of
course, it is. Mitchell is the ultimate forger here (although it is by license of the reader), but in the
intra-diegetic setup of the text, Jackson Ewing looks likely to have doctored the diary.
The reader knows, from the final pages of the diary, that Jackson Ewing, the son who has
“edited” this published diary, was born before Ewing set sail in 1850. However, we are also told
that Jackson Ewing is the same age as the first hazing victim aboard the ship: “Rafael was Jackson’s
age”. Assuming, then, an approximate earliest birthdate of 1st January 1835 for the late-teenager
Jackson Ewing, it seems likely that the furthest date within the text’s internal chronology for editing
and publication of the diary, taking an optimistic human lifespan average of 60 years for the time,
might reasonably be 1895. The diary would also have to have been edited after Ewing’s return at a
later date. If one wanted to be generous, one could extend this by 15 years to 1910, so as to also
chime approximately with the date of the diary’s “discovery” by Frobisher in the Letters from
Zedelghem section of the novel, a few years later.  The date range that this yields for Mitchell’s
Ewing chapter is, then, 1851-1910.
By most accounts, Mitchell’s novel is successful at imitating the linguistic style of the period
in which it purports to be set. However, the questions that I ask here are: how does Mitchell achieve
this?  What  are  the  limits  of  linguistic  mimesis  in  Cloud  Atlas?  And  what  kind  of  historical
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imaginary  could  function  as  a  model  against  which  we  could  measure  Mitchell’s  prose?
Specifically, I was interested in the extent to which Mitchell’s chapter is accurate in the use of
language from its claimed period. That is, I wanted to know whether, of the 13,246 words in The
Pacific Journal of Adam Ewing, any would have been inaccessible to a writer living between 1851
and 1910.
Assuming that Mitchell’s diary object attempts an accurate depiction of language from the
time of its purported authorship, an obvious first question is: are there words in the diary whose first
usage  falls  later  than  the  date  of  the  Ewing  section  of  Cloud  Atlas?  In  order  to  gauge  the
“authenticity” of the diary through the appropriateness of its linguistic register, I made two initial
preparatory modifications to the E edition’s first section of The Pacific Journal of Adam Ewing, the
portion to which Frobisher refers [QUICK NOTE ON VERSION VARIANTS]. The first pass that
I made was to split all words within the text into their own lines and then to eradicate any words
that appeared in the Project Gutenberg version of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick. Using this text as
a filter enabled me to eradicate words that were clearly in use in 1851, the first publication date for
Melville’s novel. This greatly reduced the effort involved in sequential etymological date checking
of these words. The second step was to produce a piece of software that would “scrape” sets of
open-access dictionary sites for claimed “first usages” of words and to run the remaining words
through that software. The idea behind this was that it should give an indication of any obvious
outlier words, which I would then be able to check more thoroughly. [SLIDE]
In order to militate against the challenges of etymological research data, I decided to reduce
further the terminologies studied (in addition to de-duplication and the Moby-Dick filter) to words
that appear in Ewing Part I that have etymological data in both the OED and in Dictionary.com.
This resulted in a final unique vocabulary of 896 words out of an original 13,246 terms for which I
then had two sets of etymological first-use dates.
Taking, then, a latest in-text “publication date” for the “Pacific Journal”’s first section as
1910 yields, in my search of Dictionary.com, just six anachronistic words that would definitively
not have been available to either Adam or Jackson Ewing and that occur in both editions of the text:
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“home-town”  [1910-1915],  “spillage”  [1920-1925],  “lazy-eye”  [1935-1940],  “returnees”  [1940-
1945],  “latinos”  [1945-1950],  and  “A-frame”  [1960-1965].  However,  the  Oxford  English
Dictionary disagrees. For “hometown”, it tells us, was coined in 1851; “returnee” in 1870; and “A-
frame” as far back as 1827. The OED also yields a number of terms from the novel as being after
our cut-off date that Dictionary.com does not. In the OED, through the automatic approach, we are
given: “bizarreness” [1920], “spillage” [1934], “slumped” [1937], “pulsed” [1942], “colour” (P) /
“color” (E) [1944], and “scuttlebutt” [1945]. There are some strange things going on here that are
worth briefly unpacking.
In the case of “bizarreness”, “slumped”, and “pulsed”, the OED API simply disagrees with
Dictionary.com, claiming that the specific forms of these words,  deriving from older ancestors,
were not used until  these later points. This is probably because my software is  pulling out the
incorrect part-of-speech definitions for first usage within the specific contexts. Two words have
more interesting stories behind them, though.
“Color” seems an unlikely candidate to have been coined, even in its American spelling, in
1944. Indeed, this is the case. What has actually happened here is that the OED API has taken
“color”  in  the  sense  of  “[a]ny  of  various  musical  devices  or  techniques  used  to  enhance  the
performance  of  a  piece,  esp.  a  repeated  melody  in  late-medieval  isorhythmic  motets”;  a  very
specific definition of “color”, with the main entry for perceptions of electromagnetic radiation listed
instead under “colour”. This usage of color in the musical sense appears later in Cloud Atlas but
hardly applies to the initial use here: “a Bonapartist general hiding here under assumed colo[u]rs”.
“Scuttlebutt” also has two different meanings. The older, given by Dictionary.com as first
occurring around 1800, means “an open cask of drinking water”. The usage in the text, though, is
that “Henry shall inform the ‘scuttlebutt’ that Mr Ewing has a low fever”, meaning in this case a
person who puts a rumour about. This second definition as a colloquialism, according to the OED,
comes  from 1945,  while  Dictionary.com  yields  1905.  Interestingly,  Mitchell  puts  this  term  in
quotation  marks,  as  though  the  speaker  is  using  an  informal  or  new  word.  Although  there  is
disagreement between my two etymological sources, scuttlebutt is definitely an edge-case here. It is
very unlikely that it would have been used in the informal sense during the period of purported
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authorship of the document. On the other hand, Dictionary.com does put such a use at 1905, so it
makes sense to exclude this from the final definitive list.
This  leaves,  then,  just  three  terms that,  I  feel,  can  be  said  with  certainty  to  have  been
absolutely inaccessible either to Mitchell’s historic author or the intra-diegetic editor: spillage, from
~1934; latino, from ~1946; and lazy-eye, from ~1960. These are not terms, though, that one would
readily  identify  as  anachronistic,  particularly  since  “lazy-eye”,  for  instance,  sounds  like  a
politically-incorrect term for the medical condition.
These questions of historical accuracy at the micro level bring to the fore a problem that has
vexed historical fiction and its study for many years: to what extent is mimesis to the historical
record important for historical fiction? For instance, Harry E. Shaw notes that there are two types of
representational phenomenon at play in historical fiction. A work “may represent societies, modes
of speech, or events that in very fact existed in the past” or it may “promote some sort of historical
effect within the work”.
This  “historical  effect”  can  be  seen  in  many  contemporary  takes  on  fantasy.  In  Kazuo
Ishiguro’s  remarkable  (though  not  universally  well-received)  fantasy  novel,  The  Buried  Giant
(2015),  for instance,  the inhabitants live in a hybrid ancient Saxon world of Arthurian knights,
ogres, and dragons. The novel engages, clearly, in a mode of mythopoesis: sowing its other-world
within a reader’s own past reality, cross-fertilising between a Tolkien-esque universe and ancient
Britain. Among the most interesting facets of this novel, however, is the mist of forgetting that
covers Ishiguro’s land. Indeed, the inhabitants of his story have only the weakest sense of history, a
poor historical consciousness, and are unable to remember even recent events that were nonetheless,
by all accounts, central to their lives. As the warrior Wistan puts it, “who knows what went on here
in ancient days?”
The Buried Giant is clearly not simply a fantasy tale but is also a rumination on history and
its mediation. In fact, it is a rather pessimistic meditation on the ability of fiction to reconstruct a
past.  Like  Wistan  the  reader  may  hope  that,  “by  travelling  beside”  Ishiguro’s  characters,  “the
memories would awaken”. Like Wistan they may too find, though, that “they’ve not yet done so”.
Ishiguro’s novel closes with an ambiguous warning. As the memory fog lifts, the infidelities and
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betrayals  of  the  journeying couple,  Axl  and Beatrice,  are  revealed,  in  parallel  to  a  warning of
ancient nationalistic grudges. At the end of the novel it remains unclear whether Axl and Beatrice
are allowed to journey together to the heaven-like island or whether these past grudges cause them
to fail the ferryman’s potentially unpassable test. What is clear is that  The Buried Giant warns of
recovering history, unless one is prepared to forgive its wrongs in the present.
These  are  the  types  of  question  raised  by  my  work  on  anachronism  in  contemporary
historical fiction, using computational methodologies. Using brute-force, repetitive, machine-driven
labour gives us some answers; in fact, some data. But it does not, on its own, get us any closer to
understanding  works  of  literature.  Indeed,  using  digital  tools  still  requires  a  great  deal  of
interpretative  effort  in  order  to  understand what  one has  found.  For  instance,  one of  the  other
aspects that I wanted to investigate was whether Mitchell creates a “historical effect” by simply
using  words  that  are  not  as  “popular”  as  those  used  in  a  contemporary  vocabulary.  I  quickly
knocked  up  a  script  that  would  scrape  the  Merriam  Webster  online  dictionary  for  popularity
statistics. [SLIDE]
Sadly,  it  turned  out  that  there  was  a  significant  problem  with  this  methodology.  The
underlying question that must first be answered is: what does the Merriam Webster dictionary mean
by “popular”? It turns out that the Merriam Webster score for popularity is calculated by the number
of times that each word is looked up by users online. In other words, “popularity”, as defined in the
Merriam Webster online dictionary, is not taken from any representative corpus of contemporary
use, but is determined by how frequently users visit the definition page in question. This, in turn,
raises questions as to what “popularity” might actually mean that hinges upon the reasons for which
people  turn  to  online  dictionaries.  By  Merriam  Webster’s  measure,  “popularity”  is  actually
constituted by a range of socio-behavioural and technological aspects.
For example, when a word scores in the “bottom 10%”, does this mean that: 1.) the word is
hardly ever searched for because it occurs so rarely in contemporary usage?; 2.) the word is hardly
ever searched for because it is such a common word that everybody already knows how it is used?;
3.) the word is both uncommon in usage but also very well known?; 4.) the word is easy to spell?
On the other hand, when a word is scored as being very “popular”, this could mean that: 1.) the
19/19
word is extremely rare and not very well known; 2.) the word is very common and is being searched
for by non-native speakers of the language; 3.) the word has a subsidiary use that is less familiar; 4.)
the  word  has  a  specific  grid  pattern  that  fits  with  various  word  puzzles  and  is  looked  up
disproportionately by players (“okapi”, for instance, is by far the most common crossword answer
for any grid that reads: “o_a_i”); 5.) the word has a difficult spelling and is frequently looked up not
because it is uncommon in usage but for its composition; 6.) the word has one or more homonyms
and users are seeking to disambiguate the term(s); 7.) the word has an interesting and unapparent
etymology; 8.) the word has recently featured in a popular context, giving undue exposure to the
term.
In these cases, there are not only matters of literary interpretation with which to contend, but
also matters of technological and social interpretation. The accusation that the approaches of the
digital humanities reduce us to mindless word counting – surpassing interpretation – is, in fact, a
total and pernicious falsehood. New approaches to literary empiricism, using mechanization and
digitization, leave us only with thornier questions about how we interrogate texts.
[SLIDE]
The part I don’t have time to cover today concerns terms that Mitchell uses that do not
appear in a wide contemporary magazine corpus. In the book, I show how racist, colonial terms
form the key marker of difference between Mitchell’s historical fiction and contemporary writing,
but I’m going to have to leave you in suspense for that one.
And that is where I here wish to close. I have tried, in this lecture, to paint a picture of how I
came to be where I am. Of how I believe the digital realm holds remarkable potential for education
and  research  dissemination  and of  how I  have  come to  consider  the  use  of  digital  tools  as  a
promising avenue for the study of literature. I have also charted the way in which the pre-digitality
of almost all print must be considered as a precondition of contemporary textuality. I have here
attempted to show why I believe that our digital architextures are worth both studying and worth
studying with.
[SLIDE]
